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Use Rights in American Waters 
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To hand over all these lakes to private ownership, 
under any old or narrow test of navigability, would be a 
great wrong upon the public for all time, the extent of 
which, cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated.1
* Harvard Law School, J.D. (expected 2015).  With deep gratitude to Professor Joseph
William Singer for his wisdom, insight and encouragement, the editors of the West-
Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy for their help and patience, and my
family and friends in Montana.
 
1. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn.1893).
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I. Introduction
In 2003, the State of Montana brought a lawsuit in state court seeking
to recover $41 million in rent from the owner of several hydroelectric dams 
that the state claimed lie on state-owned riverbeds.2  The dams in question 
belong to PPL Montana, LLC and lie on portions of the Missouri, Madison, 
and Clark Fork Rivers.3  Under the “equal footing doctrine,” if a body of water 
is navigable, the submerged land belongs to the state.4  If it is nonnavigable, 
the submerged land belongs to the private riparian landowners.5  The State 
of Montana argued that navigability should be determined for the whole 
river, while PPL Montana argued that each segment of the river should be 
tested for navigability to determine ownership.6  Both parties agreed the 
question is a matter of federal law.7  In a unanimous opinion, the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected the “whole river approach.”8  Ensuing academic 
scholarship offers a range of nuanced thoughts about the impact this 
decision may have on natural resource management.9
2. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1231 (2012).  The suit is was in
fact initiated by parents of schoolchildren who claimed that the dams sit on state 
school trust land.  Id. at 1225. 
  A less discussed but 
perhaps more important part of the Supreme Court’s opinion is the attempt 
to define the relationship between the “public trust doctrine” and the “equal 
footing doctrine.”  
3. Landon Newell, PPL Montana: The Supreme Court’s Modern Day City Slicker
Approach for Determining the Navigability for Title Test, 33 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 273, 274 
(2013). 
4. Id. at 275.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935) (“[I]f the waters are
not navigable in fact, the title of the United States to land underlying them remains 
unaffected by the creation of the new state.”). 
6. Newell, supra note 3, at 274.
7. See Brief for Respondent at 2, PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. 1215 (No. 10-218); Reply
Brief of Petitioner at 3, PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. 1215 (No. 10-218). 
8. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1232.
9. Some academics credit the Court for clarifying the legal rule for title of
riverbeds and ensuring that more rivers are protected by federal ownership.  See Amy 
Wegner Kho, What Lies Beneath Troubled Waters: The Determination of Navigable Rivers in PPL 
Montana, LLC, v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012), 15 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 489, 500 
(2012); see also Rachael Lipinski, The Dividing Line: Applying the Navigability-For-Title Test 
After PPL Montana, 91 OR. L. REV. 247, 271 (2012).  Others argue that the decision 
makes it “more difficult to manage, preserve, and/or protect” rivers by fragmenting 
responsibilities.  See Newell, supra note 3, at 291. 
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The State of Montana impressed upon the Court that denying the state 
title to the underlying bed for portions of rivers would transfer from state 
ownership to private ownership submerged lands protected by the state 
public trust doctrine.10  This, the State argued, warranted “the caution [the 
Court] typically exercises in matters impeding state sovereignty.”11  The 
Court however dismissed this concern, stating that the “suggestion 
underscores the State’s misapprehension of the equal footing and the public 
trust doctrine.”12  “Unlike the equal-footing doctrine, which is the 
constitutional foundation for the navigability rule of riverbed title,” the 
Court asserted, “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law . . . . 
Under the accepted principles of federalism, the States retain residual power 
to determine the scope of the public trust over waters within their borders, 
while federal law determines riverbed title under the equal-footing 
doctrine.”13
When the PPL Montana opinion was announced, another suit was 
underway in Montana over public rights in privately owned rivers and 
streams.
  In other words, the Court’s decision suggests that submerged 
lands might be both privately owned and protected by the state’s public 
trust doctrine. 
14  In 2005, the Public Lands Access Association filed suit in state 
court claiming that electric fences on the private property of Jim Kennedy, 
the billionaire heir and Chairman of Cox Media,15 obstructed public access 
to the Ruby River from the Seyler Lane Bridge and the Lewis Lane Bridge.16 
Kennedy argued that the public had no right to access the river at all.  He 
asserted that, in light of the PPL Montana opinion, the Montana Supreme 
Court had wrongly “transformed the public trust doctrine from a shield 
protecting public land from alienation into a sword through which the State 
can take a few citizens’ private property rights for public use.”17
10. Brief for Respondent, supra note 
  In essence, 
7, at 24. 
11. Id. at 27.
12. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1234.
13. Id. at 1235.
14. Public Lands Access Ass’n, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 321 P.3d 38 (Mont.
2014). 
15. Profile of Jim Kennedy in The Richest People in America List, FORBES.COM,
http://www.forbes.com/profile/jim-kennedy (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
16. Public Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d at 40-41.
17. Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant James C. Kennedy at 39-41, Public
Lands Access Ass’n, 321 P.3d 38 (No. 12-0312)  (“Under the public trust doctrine and the 
1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recreational use 
may be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability 
for nonrecreational purposes.”) (criticizing Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 
682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984)); cf. Stephen D. Osborne et al., Laws Governing 
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Mr. Kennedy reasoned that since federal law determines title to the 
underlying streambed, the state could not use the public trust doctrine to 
infringe on that title. 
Each side of the Montana public access and private property rights 
debate thought PPL Montana supported their position.  James Huffman, 
former dean of the Lewis & Clark Law School, said that PPL Montana was a 
“judicial smackdown . . . [that] called into question the legal underpinnings 
of Montana’s 30-year-old stream-access law.”18  The import of the decision, 
in Huffman’s view, is that, under the equal footing doctrine, the title does 
not belong to the state and the state cannot “enlarge what it got at 
statehood, i.e., the beds of navigable rivers only.”19  Huffman believes the 
Supreme Court’s PPL Montana decision is a warning to the State that 
“[c]laiming more would result in the expropriation of long vested private-
property rights.”20  By contrast, Jack Tuholske, a professor at Vermont Law 
School, and Bruce Farling, the executive director of Montana Trout 
Unlimited, reasoned that PPL Montana leaves states to define the scope of 
the public trust doctrine “free from interference by the federal 
government.”21
To some degree, the “public trust doctrine” and the “equal footing 
doctrine” obfuscate a simple underlying legal question: What are the public 
and private property interests in any given body of water?  Does, for 
example, an owners’ title to submerged land include the right to exclude the 
public from the water?  Does the public’s interest in the water include a right 
 
Recreational Access to Waters of the Columbia Basin: A Survey and Analysis, 33 ENVTL. L. 399, 
413 (2003) (concluding from a survey of how the public trust doctrine is applied to 
access rights in other Columbia River Basin states that “[w]hatever its scope in a 
particular state, the public trust doctrine can protect water bodies from significant 
impairments, thus providing a measure of protection for recreational uses”).  
18. James Huffman, Op-Ed, Is Stream-Access Law on the Way Out?, DAILY INTER 
LAKE (May 25, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://www.dailyinterlake.com/ 
opinion/article_a9f9e404-c5a6-11e2-ba39-0019bb2963f4.html. 
19. Id.
20. Id.  It may be worth noting that PPL Montana, in its brief to the Supreme
Court, denied that the PPL Montana case would have any impact on public access and 
use rights in privately owned waters.  See Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 7, at 3 
(“Montana’s invocations of sovereignty, the public trust, and the mystical qualities of 
Montana and its trout streams do nothing to justify its massive land grab.  This case 
is not about ‘the paramount right of public use’ of rivers. . . . The relevant river 
segments have long been and will continue to be open for fishing, recreational 
pursuits, and other beneficial uses.”). 
21. Jack Tuholske & Bruce Farling, Op-Ed, Stream Access Law Protective, Honorable,
MONT. STANDARD (June 12, 2013), http://mtstandard.com/news/opinion/Stream-access-
law-protective-honorable/article_d1d6b3d4-d30d-11e2-89ce-001a4bcf887a.html. 
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to incidental contact with the underlying land?22  There is a wide range of 
possible answers—Mr. Kennedy claimed that “title to the streambed 
entailed the right to control access to fish, wade or boat on the waters 
above . . . .”23  On the other extreme, title to the submerged land may give 
the private owner neither the right to exclude the public from traveling along 
the bed and banks or from fishing in the water (as is the case in Montana 
and many other states).24
In January 2014, the Montana State Supreme Court rejected Mr. 
Kennedy’s challenge to public use rights,
  The problem with the Supreme Court’s 
formulation in PPL Montana is that it suggests under these two doctrines 
both the state courts and the federal courts have say in the matter.  As a 
consequence, PPL Montana provides no instruction as to whether these 
questions should be answered by reference to state or federal law.  
25 finding that the public use right 
“is not a property right, or an interest in the landowners’ . . . Rather, it 
amounts to a recognition of the physical reality that in order for the public 
to recreationally use its water resource, some ‘minimal’ contact with the 
banks and beds of rivers is generally necessary.”26  Further, “[t]hat use does 
not amount to an easement or any other ‘interest’ in land” and therefore 
cannot constitute a taking.27  In other words, the Montana Supreme Court 
attempted to define public rights grounded in the state’s public trust 
doctrine as something other than interests in property.  At least one elected 
official has called for the case to be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.28
22. See, e.g., Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont.
1984) (suggesting that the public trust doctrine is applicable to surface waters 
because the State owned the water under the Constitution and the Constitution and 
the public trust doctrine establish public use rights); cf. Arkansas v. McIlroy, 595 
S.W.2d. 659, 665 (Ark. 1980) (finding public use rights in surface waters in a common 
law riparian regime). 
 
23. Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant James C. Kennedy, supra note 17, at
43. 
24. See id. at 38–40.
25. Public Lands Access Ass’n, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 321 P.3d 38, 50
(Mont. 2014). 
26. Id. at 52 (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 53.
28. Debby Barrett, Stream Access Decision Sets New, Negative Precedent for Montana
Landowners, NW. MONT. NEWS SOURCE ONLINE, (Jan. 21, 2014, 
10:25 AM), http://www.flatheadnewsgroup.com/hungryhorsenews/article_9e753af0-
82b8-11e3-9fd2-0019bb2963f4.html (“The Montana Supreme Court has had a run of 
bad luck in their decisions being challenged at the federal level lately.  The 
aforementioned unanimous overturning of their decision in the PPL case . . . and 
another unanimous overturning of their ruling on Montana’s campaign finance law, 
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This could be a tempting test case for a Supreme Court willing to recognize a 
judicial taking because the taking would be affected not by a state supreme 
court changing its state laws of property, but rather by a state supreme court 
contravening a federal concept of property found in the “equal footing 
doctrine.”29
The equal-footing and the public trust doctrines have sparked 
extensive scholarship devoted to the doctrines’ legal history
 
30 and common 
parentage.31  It is reasonable to speculate that some of the scholarship aims 
to prove the superiority of one doctrine or the infirmity of the other.32  The 
public trust doctrine, which evolved—controversially to some—from a 
presumption against alienation of public property to obligations on states 
to manage and protect public resources, has garnered more attention than 
battles over streambed title.33
Under English common law—or at least as the law stood at the time of 
the American Revolution—the Crown enjoyed presumptive title to lands 
underlying navigable waters, which included the sea and all waters subject 
  Perhaps thoroughly discrediting one of the 
two doctrines would resolve the riddle posed by the PPL Montana case.  On 
the other hand, as was proposed, the doctrines themselves may be red 
herrings.  The legal question is whether state or federal law should 
determine the extent of public and private property interests in bodies of 
water and the land beneath them.  By focusing on the federal and state case 
law, this article explains how courts have addressed that question long 
before either “public trust” or “equal footing” became principles of American 
law. 
indicate[s] a problem with [their] interpretation of constitutional rights. This case 
may move their already-poor record to 0 for 3.”). 
29. See Josh Patashnik, Bringing a Judicial Takings Claim, 64 STAN. L. REV. 255, 260
(2012) (noting that Stop the Beach Renourishment, a 2010 Supreme Court decision, 
“seems to offer a promising avenue of relief for a property owner who believes that a 
judicial opinion has changed the law in a way that deprives her of a property right 
she formerly held”); see also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010)). 
30. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 715 (1986); 
Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism and State 
Jurisprudence, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557, 563–66 (1995).  
31. James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and
Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1997). 
32. See James Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust
Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2007). 
33. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 351 (1998).
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to the ebb and flow of the tide (the sea and its arms).34  By contrast, the title 
of each riparian landowner adjacent to nonnavigable waters extended to the 
center of the river or stream—ad filum aquae.35  Although American states 
incorporated the English common law into their judicial canons,36 many 
states found the tidal definition of navigable waters unsuited for their 
unique geography and accordingly invented new definitions of “navigable” 
that expanded state title to submerged lands.  At the same time state courts 
were redefining “navigable waters” for purposes of title, federal courts were 
wrestling with the question of what constituted “navigable waters” for 
purposes of admiralty jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.37 
Eventually the federal courts rejected the English rule, extending admiralty 
jurisdiction to all waters that were “navigable in fact.”38  The definition of 
navigable waters as applied by states to determine title to submerged lands 
was not synonymous with the federal definition for purposes of Article III 
jurisdiction.39  Some states in fact retained the English rule, limiting state 
ownership of submerged lands to waters subject to the ebb and flow of the 
tide, while other states defined navigable waters more broadly than the 
federal courts.40
This distinction between federal and state law survived—both in the 
federal and state courts—for well over a century.  It wasn’t until the 1920s 
that the federal courts decided that the equal footing doctrine made 




34. Rasband, supra note 31, at 9–11.
  In the aftermath of this transformation, state courts continued 
to assert public rights in waters that failed the federal definition of 
35. S. F. D., Codification and Reform of the Law-No. III, 16 AM. JURIST & L. MAG.59, 69
(1836). 
36. Kathleen Keffer, Choosing a Law to Live by Once the King Is Gone, 24 REGENT U. 
L. REV. 147, 157–59 (2011).
37. See infra Part III.
38. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870) (overruling The Steamboat Thomas
Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1851)). 
39. Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); see infra text accompanying
notes 125–30. 
40. S. F. D., supra note 35, at 70.  The authors of Codification and Reform of the Law
in 1836 noted that “whatever opinion may be entertained on this point, no one would 
contend, that a distinction should exist, between proprietors above, and those 
below, the uncertain line, where the tide ceases to ebb and flow, merely because of 
that circumstance.”  Id. 
41. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); see infra text
accompanying notes 175–84. 
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“navigable” by adopting a different question of “navigable” for public use.42 
By expanding definitions of navigable waters for use (as opposed to title) 
and by recognizing the right of the public to incidental contact with the 
submerged lands of “navigable” waters, some states have managed to 
provide the public with use rights similar to what the public would have with 
title to the submerged land.43  The “public trust” doctrine is one tool state 
courts have relied on in their efforts to expand public rights in private 
waters.44
II. The English Common Law in Early American Courts
  This article explains how federal and state court precedents have 
led to the present day impasse of the PPL Montana case and exposes some 
underlying legal myths that helped to usher us into this predicament. 
Mr. Carson must have been a bit upset when, on April 10th, 1803, a
man “trod down his grass,” entered the fishery adjacent to the 228 acres he 
owned along the Susquehanna River, and proceeded to haul off with a 
thousand fish.45  Under the English common law rule, if a river was not 
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, it was not navigable.46  As a 
consequence, title of the riparian landowner—and the exclusive right of 
fishery—extended to the middle of the river, ad filum medium aquae.47  The 
plaintiff insisted on this point, arguing that “there is no flow and reflow of 
the tide . . . therefore, although navigated by boats of a certain 
description . . . [the Susquehanna] does not come within the legal definition 
of a navigable river.”48  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, rejected 
the English rule as “highly unreasonable when applied to [Pennsylvania’s] 
large rivers.”49
42. See infra Part VI.A (discussing Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9 (1849) and
Shaw v. Oswego, 10 Or. 371 (1882)). 
  Chief Justice Tilghman concluded that “the owner of land on 
the banks of the Susquehanna, has no exclusive right to fish in the river 
immediately in front of his lands, but that right to fisheries in that river is 
43. See infra text accompanying notes 239–45 (discussing Arkansas v. McIlroy,
595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980)). 
44. See infra Part VI.B.
45. Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 475 (Pa. 1810).  The fish taken were American
shad, id., which return upstream each spring to their birthplace to spawn.  Rich 
Remer, Fishtown and the Shad Fisheries, PA. LEGACIES, Nov. 2002, at 20, 20.  Thus the 
fishery constructed by Mr. Carson’s brother was presumably the birthplace for the 
shad taken by Mr. Blazer.  Carson, 2 Binn. at 477. 
46. Rasband, supra note 31, at 9–11.
47. Carson, 2 Binn. at 483–84.
48. Id. at 479.
49. Id. at 478.
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vested in the state, and open to all.”50  Pennsylvania was perhaps the first 
state to openly question the adequacy of the English “ebb and flow” 
standard for navigable waters in the United States, but other states shortly 
followed with their own consideration—and often rejection—of the English 
rule.51
A. New Jersey Before and After Martin v. Lessee of Waddell
 
To address whether federal or state law determines the definition of 
“navigable waters” for the purpose of title, New Jersey offers important cases 
for consideration.  In two cases, forty-six years apart, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court remained steadfast in its conviction that defining navigable 
waters for purposes of title was fundamentally a state law question.  In 
between these two New Jersey cases, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Martin 
v. Lessee of Waddell, a case cited by Justice Kennedy in PPL Montana as
fundamental in establishing a federal definition of navigable waters for
purposes of title.52  The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decisions—one
preceding and one following Martin—demonstrate state resistance to the
imposition of a federal definition for waters which the states had
traditionally defined.53
50. Carson, 2 Binn. at 495.
51. See, e.g., Peck v. Lockwood, 5 Day 22, 25–26 (Conn. 1811) (rejecting a call for
“any train of reasoning as to what is most or least reasonable” and accepting the 
English common law rule); Cates’ Ex’rs v. Wadlington, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 580, 580 
(1822) (finding no “legislative act declaring which, or whether any of our rivers are to 
be considered as public or navigable rivers,” but still rejecting the English common 
law rule “in this state, where our rivers are navigable several hundred miles above the 
flowing tide.”); Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 30, 34–35 (1828) (dismissing the 
English common law rule as “entirely inapplicable to [North Carolina’s] situation, 
arising both from the great length of our rivers, extending far in the interior, and the 
sand-bars and other obstructions at their mouths.”). 
52. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S.Ct  1215, 1227 (2012); see Jas. Jeffrey
Adams & Cody Winterton, Navigability in Oregon: Between a River Rock and a Hard Place, 41 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 615, 620 n.28 (2005)  (“[Martin v. Waddell] is central to the equal 
footing doctrine. The court stated the rule controlling ownership of shorelines, beds 
and banks of navigable-for-title watercourses in relation to the original 13 states.”).  
Other scholars also identify Martin as an important step in the development of a 
federal definition of navigable waters. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois 
Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 828 (2004). 
53. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 1 (1821); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 371–
72 (1867). 
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The first New Jersey case, Arnold v. Mundy, decided twenty-one years 
before Martin, confirmed the English common law definition of navigable 
and, more interestingly, planted the seed of what would become the public 
trust doctrine years later.54  In Arnold, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant 
“enter[ed] upon the plaintiff’s oyster bed” and carried off with his oysters.55  
Whether the plaintiff had exclusive possession to the submerged lands 
hinged on whether the title to the adjacent land, which could be traced back 
to a grant conveyed by King Charles II, did (or even could) include title to 
the underlying bed.56  Chief Justice Kirpatrick’s majority opinion included 
two essential findings: first, it affirmed the English rule that title to 
submerged lands of tidal waters was presumptively owned by the sovereign57 
and second, it found that the sovereign could not have conveyed that title.58 
In oft-quoted language, Kirkpatrick proclaimed: 
I say I am of opinion, that by all these, the navigable rivers in 
which the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays, the coasts of 
the sea, including both the water and the land under the water, 
for the purposes of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, 
fowling, sustenance, and all the other uses of the water and its 
products (a few things excepted) are common to all the 
citizens . . . ; that the property, indeed, strictly speaking, is vested 
in the sovereign, but it is vested in him not for his own use, but 
the for the use of the citizen, that is, for his direct and immediate 
enjoyment.59
The first finding of his decision—that the sovereign holds presumptive 
title to the land underlying navigable water—is simply a restatement of the 
English common law rule.  The second finding of Justice Kirkpatrick’s 
decision—that the lands beneath navigable waters could not be conveyed 
into private ownership—became the fundamental tenet of the public trust 
 
54. Arnold, 6 N.J.L at 10–12.
55. Id. at 9.
56. Huffman, supra note 32, at 37–39.
57. Arnold, 6 N.J.L at 10.  (“[A] grant of land to a subject or citizen, bounded
upon a fresh water stream or river, where the tide neither ebbs nor flows, extends to 
the middle of the channel of such river; but that a grant bounded upon a navigable 
river, or other water, where the tide does ebb or flow, extends to the edge of the 
water only, that is to say, to high water mark, when the tide is high, and to low water 
mark, when the tide is low, but it extends no farther. . . . All pretence of claim, 
therefore, to this bed, founded upon the possession of the adjacent land, must fail.”). 
58. Id. at 11–12; see also, e.g., Huffman, supra note 32, at 38.
59. Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 11–12.
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doctrine.60
Shortly after Arnold, New Jersey passed a statute allowing landowners 
of tidal-influenced riparian land to lease portions of the adjacent submerged 
land from the state for use as private oyster beds.
  It is important to note that the oyster beds at issue in Arnold were 
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; therefore, there was no real question 
as to whether the oyster beds were, according to the English common law 
definition, navigable waters.  The only real dispute in Arnold was whether the 
sovereign—the state or the Crown—could convey title to navigable waters. 
61  In Martin v. Lessee of 
Waddell, the plaintiff had complied with the statute and sought to eject the 
defendant, who claimed to have a superior title to the submerged lands 
granted by King Charles II.62  To reconcile these facts, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reviewed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Arnold—that the 
Crown could not convey submerged lands.63  The plaintiff argued that 
“[p]rivate rivers are presumed to be owned by the adjacent proprietors. Not 
so with public rivers; they are, at common law, in the king.”64  Thus, the 
Crown could not have transferred the seabed into private ownership.65 
Directly noting that the case required passing judgment on the Arnold 
decision,66 the plaintiff asserted that the issue was solely a matter of state 
law and that the federal courts, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, must decide 
the matter consistent with the state law: “[I]t is state law [the federal courts] 
are to apply, not to review, alter or remodel . . . .  The federal courts follow, 
and do not lead; their jurisdiction is occasional.  Perhaps, not one part in 
ten thousand of the public waters in question, are under the jurisdiction of 
this court at all.”67  Chief Justice Taney, writing for the majority, determined 
that the decision rested not on state law or federal law but rather English 
law.  The essential issue was whether the Crown’s title to the navigable 
waters, and the soils under them, “were intended to be a trust for the 
common use . . . or private property to be parceled out and sold to 
individuals . . . .”68
60. See BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW, AND 
ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY 45–57 (1998). 
  The Court reasoned that this inquiry would require 
consideration of “[t]he laws and institutions of England, the history of the 
times, the object of the charter, the contemporaneous construction given to 
it, and the usages under it, for the century or more which has since 
61. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 379 (1842).
62. Id. at 378–80.
63. Huffman, supra note 32, at 44.
64. Martin, 41 U.S. at 383.
65. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 4 (1821).
66. Martin, 41 U.S. at 389.
67. Id. at 389–90.
68. Id. at 411.
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elapsed.”69  From these sources, the Court found that “the shores, and rivers 
and bays and arms of the sea, and the land under them [were] held as a 
public trust for the benefit of the whole community, to be freely used by all 
for navigation and fishery.”70  Additionally, the Court acknowledged in dicta 
that it was universal throughout the colonies to “enjoy in common, the 
benefits and advantages of the navigable waters, for the same purposes, and 
to the same extent, that they have been used and enjoyed, for centuries, in 
England.”71
At the time of the Martin decision, many states had considered and 
expanded by judicial opinion the English doctrine for determining title to 
submerged lands.
  
72  These states had treated the issue of what was 
“navigable” for purposes of title as a state law issue.73  Martin was a 
departure from this only in the sense that it was a decision by the Supreme 
Court.  Therefore, the emphasis, should be placed on the fact that the Court 
addressed whether the crown could convey title in trust lands.  In rejecting 
the view that this was a matter of state law, the Supreme Court, if anything, 
was suggesting that the trust doctrine—not the definition of navigable 
waters—was a federal law question.74
Importantly, the Court decided Martin by reference to English common 
law—not the law as it was evolving in the states.  If determining title for a 
conveyance from the Crown prior to a state’s succession as sovereign 
requires application of the common law of England, conveyances made by 
the federal government prior to the admission of a state to the union might 
require application of some Federal common law.  It is worth noting that 
many states that were not one of the original thirteen colonies redefined 
navigable waters as a matter of state law, such as Tennessee in 1845,
 
75 Iowa 
in 1856,76 and Minnesota in 189377
69. Martin, 41 U.S. at 411.
 and these decisions effected proprietors 
who had obtained grants of land from the federal government prior to 
70. Id. at 413.
71. Id. at 414.
72. S. F. D., supra note 35, at 70.
73. Id.
74. See Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV.
6, 6 (1910) (noting that at least for some period of time, “the common law” was 
thought to be universal and was assumed to be “or ought to be the same in all the 
states where the common law is supposed to prevail”); cf. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 
371, 381–84 (1891) (discussing the relationship between state, federal, and common 
law). 
75. Elder v. Burrus, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 358 (1845).
76. McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Clarke 1 (Iowa 1856).
77. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn.1893).
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statehood.  Thus, state courts continued immediately and long after Martin 
to treat the definition of navigable waters as a matter of state law without 
reference to either English or Federal common law. 
Three years after Martin, the Supreme Court decided Pollard v. Hagan,78 
another case in the narrative of establishing a federal definition of navigable 
waters for purposes of title.79  Pollard arose from facts quite similar to those 
in Martin, except that Alabama, where the facts of Pollard took place, was 
admitted to the Union after the original thirteen colonies.  Therefore, while 
Martin turned on English law because the title claim included a grant from 
the Crown, the plaintiffs in Pollard claimed that the United States had 
inherited its sovereignty over the territory that became Alabama from the 
King of Spain.80  Spain, being a civil law country, did not adhere to the same 
“public trust” doctrine under common law followed by the Court in Martin.81 
The plaintiff reasoned that the United States government had the sovereign 
capacity, just as the King of Spain had, “to grant to a subject the soil under 
navigable waters.”82  Evoking the equal footing language, the Supreme Court 
held that Alabama must be accepted to the Union with the same 
“sovereignty and jurisdiction” of the states preceding it.83  “To maintain any 
other doctrine,” the Court reasoned, “is to deny that Alabama has been 
admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original states.”84
The ensuing question, of course, is what should be considered as 
governing the “sovereignty and jurisdiction” provided under equal footing? 




78. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
  The most literal reading might be that this rejected 
the English common law rule in favor of the developing (but not uniform) 
rule of navigable waters in the American states.  However, since the 
submerged land in question was not outside the scope of the English 
common law, another explanation may be offered for the “modification” 
recognized by the Supreme Court.  In this instance, the Court seems to have 
been concerned with what the state could or could not do with the 
submerged lands of navigable waters.  In rebuking the claim that the federal 
government could convey submerged land prior to admitting a state to the 
Union, the Court proclaimed: 
79. Robert Barrett, History of an Equal Footing: Ownership of the Western Federal
Lands, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 761, 783–84 (1997). 
80. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 225.
81. Id. at 228–29.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 229.
85. Id.
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This right of eminent domain over the shores and the soils under 
the navigable waters, for all municipal purposes, belongs 
exclusively to the states within their respective territorial 
jurisdictions, and they, and they only, have the constitutional 
power to exercise it.  To give to the United States the right to 
transfer to a citizen the title to the shores and the soils under the 
navigable waters, would be placing in their hands a weapon 
which might be wielded greatly to the injury of state sovereignty, 
and deprive the states of the power to exercise a numerous and 
important class of police powers.86 
Perhaps no more persuasive proof that the Martin decision was not 
meant to displace state sovereignty over which waters are public can be 
offered than by reference to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1867 opinion in 
Cobb v. Davenport, which clearly reiterated that the issue was a matter for the 
state to decide.87  The Cobb opinion also made clear, if it was not done so in 
Arnold, that New Jersey was satisfied to adopt the limited English rule.88  The 
plaintiff in Cobb asserted an exclusive right to fish on Green Pond based on 
the English common law definition of “navigable waters”89 but also 
acknowledged that “[t]here are American cases to the contrary . . . which go 
upon the grounds that the beds of the large navigable rivers were never 
granted to the riparian owners.”90  The defendant, on the other hand, argued 
for a navigability-in-fact standard: “Are the waters actually navigable?  That is 
the practical test.  The tidal test contains no principle, and has not been 
adopted here as part of the common law.”91  Pointing out that Green Pond 
was “a natural lake, three miles long and nearly one mile wide,” the 
defendant’s counsel argued that it should be treated as an inland sea, 
subject to the same principles that determined that the submerged land 
belonged to the state in Arnold and Martin.92  The New Jersey Supreme Court, 
however, found “nothing in topography or location [of New Jersey] that 
requires a departure from the rules of the common law,” and declined to 
expand the English definition of navigable waters beyond those subject to 
the ebb and flow of the tide.93
86. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 230.
  The court preferred the English rule, which 
87. Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 383–84 (N.J. 1867).
88. Id. at 378–79.
89. Id. at 370.
90. Id. at 371–72.
91. Id. at 374 (emphasis in original).
92. Id. at 374.
93. Cobb, 32 N.J.L. at 380.
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was uniform and clear, over the navigable-in-fact standard, which the court 
found “wanting in that accuracy and certainty at which the law aims.”94
B. Other State Law Decisions after Martin and Pollard v.
Hagan
  
After Martin, other state courts continued to define navigable waters 
for purposes of title under state law.  Only three years after the Martin 
decision, Tennessee adopted the broader definition of “navigable” for 
purposes of title.95  The Supreme Court of Tennessee contrasted the 
common law of Great Britain, based in part on “[t]he insular position of 
Great Britain, the short courses of her rivers, and the well-known fact there 
are none of them navigable above tide-water but for very small craft” with 
the civil law of continental Europe, which provides that “all rivers, even 
above tide-water, provided are navigable for shops or boats, are considered 
as public property.”96  Considering the geography of Tennessee, the court 
concluded that “to adopt the English principle . . . would be . . . an absurdity 
too monstrous to be thought of.”97  Furthermore, the court found that 
Tennessee had no obligation to adopt the English rule because the State 
had not incorporated those parts of English common law that were 
“repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom and independence of this 
State, and the frame of government therein established.”98  Since the English 
common law rule for navigability was “so obviously at war with the position 
of our country and its best interests,” the court concluded that the English 
rule “had never been in force and use in [Tennessee].”99
One of the last state court opinions defining “navigability” for 
purposes of title comes from Minnesota in 1893.
 
100  Lamprey v. Metcalf is an 
impressive opinion that deserves to be discussed at length, not only 
because the Supreme Court of Montana cited it nearly a century later,101
94. Cobb, 32 N.J.L. at 379–80.
 but 
also because of the clarity with which it handles the question of public 
versus private ownership.  The dispute in Lamprey concerned the title to dry 
land that had been submerged beneath a nonnavigable lake at the time of 
95. Elder v. Burrus, 25 Tenn. 358, 359–62 (1845).
96. Id. at 366.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 367
99. Id. at 367–68.
100. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn.1893).
101. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 169 (Mont. 1984)
(quoting Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143). 
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conveyance by the federal government prior to Minnesota’s statehood.102 
The riparian owners asserted title against objection by the State, which 
claimed that “the former bed of the lake belongs to the state, in its sovereign 
capacity.”103  The court considered two issues: first, whether the riparian 
owner had title to the bed before the lake dried up and, second, if not, 
whether the riparian gained title to the dry land as the lake disappeared.104 
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that, although it may have 
previously thought that federal law would control the issue, the United 
States Supreme Court had not explicitly adopted such a stance.105  Thus, the 
Court concluded that “whether the land forming the beds of these lakes 
belongs to the state, or to the owners of the riparian lands, is a question to 
be determined entirely by the laws of Minnesota.”106
Just like the Supreme Court of Tennessee a half-century prior and the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania almost a century earlier, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court began its analysis with consideration of the English rule.
 
107 
And just as those courts that had considered the English rule as ill-fit to 
their geography, the Minnesota court compared itself favorably to England, 
where “there are but few lakes.”108  The court also differentiated itself from 
the English rule temporally, noting that: 
In early times, about the only use—except, perhaps, fishing—to 
which the people of England had occasion to put public waters, 
and about the only use to which such waters were adapted, was 
navigation, and the only waters suited to that purpose were 
those in which the tide ebbed and flowed.109  
After considering the policy merits of public versus private ownership 
of lake beds, the court framed the question in a broader way than earlier 
state court decisions: “The division of waters into navigable and 
nonnavigable is but a way of dividing them into public and private waters . . . 
the line of division being largely determined by its conditions and habits.”110




105. Id. at 1141 (“We therefore approach the question in this case
untrammeled by the binding authority of any federal decisions, or even by any direct 
decisions in this state, in which this is still an open question.”) 
106. Id. at 1140.
107. Id. at 1141; see supra notes 46–47 (discussing the English Rule).
108. Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1141.
109. Id. at 1143.
110. Id.
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“But,” the court posed, “if, under present conditions of society, bodies of 
water are used for public uses other than mere commercial navigation, in its 
ordinary sense, we fail to see why they ought not to be held to be public 
waters, or navigable waters, if the old nomenclature is preferred.”111  After 
contemplating the myriad different interests and uses the public might have 
over time, the court stated that “[t]o hand over all these lakes to private 
ownership, under any old or narrow test of navigability, would be a great 
wrong upon the public for all time”112  Thus, the court adopted a rule that 
reflected the public uses at the time: “[S]o long as these lakes are capable of 
use for boating, even for pleasure, they are navigable, within the spirit of the 
common-law rule.”113  This definition of navigable would eventually be 
referred to as the “recreational use” test, later adopted by many states 
seeking to protect public use of state waters as well as states protecting 
public use of beaches.114
III. The Development of a Federal Definition of Navigable
Waters for Purposes of Admiralty Jurisdiction
 
What can be said with confidence after reviewing the state law cases—
but is perhaps underappreciated—is that for more than the first century of 
American history, states, as sovereigns, freely modified the common law rule 
regarding public waters as they saw fit for their circumstance.  But federal 
courts at this time were concerned with the definition of navigable waters for 
a very different purpose—to determine the admiralty jurisdiction of the 
courts under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.115
In an 1825 case, The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson,
 
116 the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided that admiralty jurisdiction would be limited to navigable waters as 
defined by the “ebb and flow” rule of English common law.117  The dispute in 
The Thomas Jefferson arose far inland on the Missouri River, in an area not 
subject to the tide, and, as a result, the Court ruled that it did not have 
jurisdiction to consider the case.118
111. Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143.
  In 1845, Congress enacted legislation 
extending the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts to the Great 
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1144.
114. See infra notes 239–45 (discussing Arkansas v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d. 659
(Ark. 1980)). 
115. See The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 430 (1851).
116. Id.
117. Mary Garvey Algero, Ebb and Flow of the Tide: A Viable Doctrine for Determining
Admiralty Jurisdiction or a Relic of the Past?, 1 LOY. MAR. L.J. 47, 50–51 (2002). 
118. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. at 430.
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Lakes.119  That legislation was challenged as being beyond the constitutional 
limit of admiralty jurisdiction in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh.120 
Perhaps recognizing the error of applying a tidal limit in an increasingly 
inland nation, the Court upheld the statute and overturned its decision in 
The Thomas Jefferson.121  The Court surmised: 
It is evident that a definition that would at this day limit public 
rivers in this country to tidewater rivers is utterly inadmissible. 
We have thousands of miles of public navigable water, including 
lakes and rivers in which there is no tide.  And certainly there can 
be no reason for admiralty power over a public tidewater, which 
does not apply with equal force to any other public water used 
for commercial purposes and foreign trade.122  
Extension of admiralty jurisdiction eventually evolved into what has 
become known as the “navigable in fact” standard.  In The Daniel Ball,123 an 
1870 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that federal admiralty 
jurisdiction extended to all waters that are navigable in fact and “they are 
navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in 
their ordinary condition, as highway for commerce, over which trade and 
travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel 
on water.”124
Barney v. City of Keokuk,
  It is clear from the opinion in The Daniel Ball that navigable 
waters for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction remained a separate question 
from navigable waters for purposes of title to submerged lands, as defined 
by the states. 
125
119. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 443
(1851). 
 which followed The Daniel Ball by only six years, 
further eliminated any confusion between the state law definitions of 
navigable for purposes of title and the definition of navigable for purposes 
of admiralty jurisdiction.  In Barney, the City of Keokuk had extended the 
shore of the Mississippi River by about two hundred feet to build a railroad. 
The railroad line, however cut off the homeowner on Water Street from 
access to the river.  No doubt upset about this, the homeowner argued that 
title to the artificially reclaimed portion of the River was his as the 
120. Id. at 446–47.
121. Algero, supra note 117, at 52.
122. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. at 457.
123. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870).
124. Id. at 563.
125. Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
West  Northwest, Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 2015 
87 
riparian.126  In a paragraph too long to cite in full, but worth parsing 
carefully, the Court began by noting that artificially reclaimed portions of 
navigable waters, under the English common law rule, belonged to the 
crown.127  The Court then pointed out that “the only waters recognized in 
England as navigable were tide-waters,” and lamented that the: 
[C]onfusion of navigable with tide water . . . had the influence for
two generations of excluding the admiralty jurisdiction from our
great rivers and inland seas; and under the like influence it laid
the foundation in many States of doctrines with regard to the
ownership of navigable waters above tide-water at variance with
sound principles of public policy.128
Clearly, the Court differentiates between “navigable” as it relates to 
admiralty jurisdiction and “navigable” as it relates to ownership.  Further, it 
notes that ownership of navigable waters is decided by state law.129  If there 
is any doubt, the Court went on to say that the question of title to 
submerged lands “properly belongs to the States by their inherent 
sovereignty, and the United States has wisely abstained from extending (if it 
could extend) its survey and grants beyond the limits of high water.”130
IV. The Continued Reliance on State Law Definitions of
Navigable Waters for Purposes of Title
  
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and state courts accepted this distinction 
between navigable waters for federal admiralty jurisdiction (a question of 
federal law) and navigable waters for purposes of title (a state law question) 
well into the 20th Century with one exception—Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. 
Illinois.131  In light of the Court’s prior decision in Hardin v. Jordan132 and the 
Court’s subsequent decisions,133
126. Barney, 94 U.S. at 327.
 Illinois Central was clearly an exception to the 
well-established rule for a single reason: The dispute involved title to one of 
the Great Lakes—America’s inland seas. 
127. Id. at 337–38.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 334.
130. Id. at 338.
131. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
132. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); see Kearney & Merrill, supra note 52,
at 919; see also Douglas L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from 
Illinois Central Railroad, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 868–69 (2001). 
133. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Great Inland Seas Exception: Hardin and Illinois
Central
Considering that Illinois Central has become a rather infamous case in 
American legal discourse,134 it is surprising how little attention is given to 
Hardin.135
Hardin did not in fact involve a dispute over the Great Lakes, but rather 
involved a title dispute for a relatively small lake.
  But Hardin shows that the Supreme Court in Illinois Central was not 
creating a new federal rule to determine title to all submerged lands. 
Rather, Hardin makes clear that the Supreme Court in Illinois Central treated 
the Great Lakes as an exception to the general rule that title to submerged 
lands is a question of state law. 
136  The Court affirmed that 
the question of title to submerged lands “depends on the law of each state” 
and proceeded to decide the case exclusively under Illinois state law.137 
Noting that “some of the states” had extended the English rule to navigable 
rivers, the Court observed that Illinois had adhered to the narrower English 
rule “that the beds of all streams above the flow of the tide, whether actually 
navigable or not, belong to the proprietors of the adjoining lands.”138  The 
Court added that these “observations do not apply to our great navigable 
lakes, which are really inland seas.”139  The conclusion of Hardin was that 
since Illinois adhered to the common law rule (and had not expanded the 
definition of navigable waters above the tide), the lake in questions 
belonged to the riparian owners and not the state.140
134. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 132, at 868–69.
 
135. Hardin is referenced, if at all, only for the premise that the Great Lakes
should be treated like seas for purposes of the public trust doctrine.  See, e.g., 
Kenneth K. Kilbert, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes Shores, 58 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 1, 27 (2010). 
136. Hardin, 140 U.S. at 372.
137. Id. at 382; see Janice Lawrence, Lyon and Fogerty: Unprecedented Extensions of the
Public Trust, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1138, 1141 (1982) (suggesting that the Court’s choice of 
state law undermines the concept of a Federal public trust doctrine, not the validity 
of the equal footing doctrine). 
138. Hardin, 140 U.S. at 383 (citing Beckman v. Kreamer, 43 Ill. 447 (1867)).
139. Id. at 391.
140. Id. at 397.  After first pronouncing this a matter of state law, the Court
found that Illinois adhered to the common law and, not finding persuasive precedent 
in Illinois state law otherwise, asserted that the Supreme Court is “not without 
express authority, in addition to that of Lord Coke, as to the rule of the common 
law.”  Id. at 391. 
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Illinois Central, by contrast, was a dispute over title to the submerged 
lands of Lake Michigan along the shore of Chicago.141  The State of Illinois 
had conveyed title of the submerged portion of Lake Michigan to the Illinois 
Central Railroad Company in 1870 and repealed the conveyance three years 
later.142  When the railroad company refused to quit the submerged lands, 
the Attorney General brought suit seeking to quiet title in the state.143  The 
Court began its opinion by noting that when Illinois entered the United 
States in 1818, it had done so “on an equal footing with the original 
states . . . [with] no distinction between the several states of the Union in 
the character of the jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dominion which they may 
possess and exercise”144  Further, the Court noted, “[i]t is the settled law of 
this country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands 
covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several states, belong to the 
respective states within which they are found.”145  The Court, without any 
reference to the state law of Illinois, went on to reject the tidal ebb and flow 
limits of the English common law, noting that this doctrine “is now 
repudiated in this country as wholly inapplicable to our condition.”146  This 
would be a sudden departure from the holding in Hardin, except that the 
Supreme Court in Hardin made clear that the Great Lakes present an 
exceptional case.  Hardin and Illinois read together hold that while states may 
generally define navigability for purposes of title, this prerogative does not 
apply to the Great Lakes—America’s “inland seas.”147
B. After Illinois Central: Shively v. Bowlby and Donnelly v.
United States
  
The issue of title to submerged lands came before the Supreme Court 
again only two years after Illinois Central in Shively v. Bowlby,148 a dispute over 
title to the tidal lands below the high-water mark of the Columbia River in 
Oregon.  In this case, the Court directly confronted the issue of how 
conveyances made prior to statehood should be treated,149
141. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 433–34 (1892).
 but it cannot be 
said that this was a novel problem.  Hardin, in fact, was a dispute over a 
conveyance made by the federal government in which “all the justices 
142. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 448–49.
143. Id. at 433–34.
144. Id. at 434.
145. Id. at 435.
146. Id.
147. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 391 (1891).
148. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
149. Id. 57–58.
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agreed that the question must be determined by the law of Illinois.”150  Also, 
as noted, the Lamprey opinion involved a conveyance made prior to 
statehood.151  The Shively opinion provides an incredibly thorough review of 
both federal and state court treatment of navigable waters.  Although the 
Court affirmed Oregon’s sovereignty over the matter, the decision was not 
difficult in part because the controversy was over tidal waters.  Even still, the 
Court made sure to reference the law of Oregon regarding title to submerged 
lands in its opinion.152
No federal case is more cited by states in support of the proposition 
that they “may adopt their own definitions of navigability” than Donnelly v. 
United States.
  There could be little doubt at the end of the 19th 
century that states enjoyed the right and responsibility as sovereigns to 
determine, within their own borders, what bodies of water would be 
considered navigable and, consequently, whether the title to the submerged 
lands of these waters rested with the public or private riparian proprietors.   
153 And perhaps no other case in the lexicon of “navigable” 
waters concerns murder.  In a federal proceeding, Donnelly was indicted, 
convicted of murder, and sentenced to life in prison for shooting a 
Chickasaw Indian “in or near the edge of the water of the Klamath river” in 
California.154  Donnelly challenged the jurisdiction of the federal courts.155  If 
he was within the limits of the Extension of the Hoop Valley Reservation, he 
was in the jurisdiction of the federal government.156  If, on the other hand, 
Donnelly was on state land, the federal court lacked jurisdiction to convict 
him.157  It seems accepted that Donnelly was “upon the Klamath river.”158
150. Shively, 152 U.S. at 45.
 
The question then was whether the Klamath River was part of the 
reservation or owned by the state.  In deciding this question, the Court 
noted that under the equal footing language articulated in Pollard, “the state 
had the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over the navigable waters 
as the original states . . . and that the title of the navigable waters, and the 
soil beneath them, was in the state, and subject to its sovereignty and 
jurisdiction.”  Citing now familiar cases such as Barney, the Court concluded 
that “what shall be deemed a navigable water within the meaning of the 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 102–03 (discussing Lamprey v. Metcalf,
53 N.W. 1139 (Minn.1893)). 
152. Shively, 152 U.S. at 55–59.
153. Arkansas v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d. 659, 663 (Ark. 1980) (citing Donnelly v.
United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913)). 





West  Northwest, Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 2015 
91 
local rules of property is for the determination of the several states.”159 
Examining the local law, the Court found that California had adopted the 
English rule and that the “subsequent judicial history of the state” showed 
that this “operated . . . as a transfer to all riparian proprietors, including the 
United States, of the property of the state, if any she had, in the non-
navigable streams and the soil beneath them.”160  Given the emphasis of the 
Supreme Court that the “appropriate authorities of California” determine 
title to the river,161 it should not be surprising that Donnelly has been cited as 
recently as 1980 for the right of states to determine “navigable waters.”162
V. The Switch from a State to Federal Definition of
Navigable Waters for Purposes of Title
  
The phrase “equal footing” appears to have entered the American 
lexicon through the Northwest Ordinance, the predecessor to which had 
been drafted by Thomas Jefferson and reflected his desire that new states 
“be politically equal to the original 13 states.”163  The Supreme Court, in 
Pollard, Shively, and several other cases related to the nature of sovereign 
control of states over navigable waters invoked this language to support the 
principle that each state inherited title to the submerged lands of navigable 
waters upon entering the union.164  To borrow the language from Illinois 
Central: “The state of Illinois was admitted into the Union in 1818 on an 
equal footing with the original states, in all respects . . . .  There can be no 
distinction between the several states of the Union in the character of the 
jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dominion which they may possess and 
exercise over persons and subjects within their respective limits.”165
This could be read to mean that the question of navigable waters for 
purposes of title is a question of federal law.  That conclusion not only runs 
counter to the preceding history, which demonstrates that defining 
“navigable” waters for purposes of title was a question of state law, but also 
contradicts the holding in Hardin only a year prior to Illinois Central, wherein 
the Court reaffirmed that the definition of “navigable” waters was essentially 
a question of state law.  A better explanation of the Supreme Court’s 
 
159. Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 262.
160. Id. at 263–64.
161. Id.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 230–38, 246–51 (discussing Day v.
Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961) and Arkansas v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d. 659 (Ark. 
1980)). 
163. Rasband, supra note 31, at 32.
164. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 216 (1845); Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 27 (1894). 
165. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 434.
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reference to the equal footing doctrine in these early title cases is for the 
more limited principle that each new state entered the union with nothing 
less than the title to the submerged lands encompassed by the English rule. 
That would explain at least Martin, Pollard, and Shively, since all three 
concerned tidal waters.  The odd case out appears to be Illinois Central, but as 
also was shown in the prior discussion, U.S. courts treated the Great Lakes 
as inland seas and, even if not subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, within 
the spirit of the English rule.  It seems noteworthy that not one case in the 
first 150 years of the new American republic invoking the equal footing 
language denied a state’s claim to title of submerged lands.  A 1921 article 
in the Harvard Law Review capably sums up the generally accepted position:  
Whether ownership of riparian lands extends to the middle 
thread, or stops with meander lines or with low-water lines, are 
local questions determined by state law, which is binding on the 
federal courts, even to the latest decision changing the local 
rules. And this applies to claims of title under federal grants, and 
to accretions and made land in national streams like the 
Mississippi.166  
A series of three cases from 1922 to 1931 changed the question of title 
from local to federal law and should be recognized today as the actual 
starting point of the “equal footing doctrine” as applied to questions of title. 
A. The Brewer-Holt-Utah Trilogy
The first case in the trilogy, Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 
involved a dispute over title to the bed and banks of portions of the 
Arkansas River.167
166. Merritt Starr, Navigable Waters of the United States—State and National Control,
35 HARV. L. REV. 154, 164 (1921).  Starr also declared that: 
  The United States, acting as trustee for the Osage Tribe of 
The shores and beds of navigable waters in the original states were not 
granted to the national government, but were reserved to the states. And 
upon the admission of new states to the Union the beds of navigable 
rivers within their boundaries passed to the states, so that they have the 
same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over the shores and beds as 
have the original states.  The status of this land is determined by the law 
of each state.   
Id. at 162.  Starr could have meant by “status” either that the alienability of the land 
(public trust doctrine) or the original title to the land (equal footing doctrine) is a 
matter of state law.  The phrase quoted in the text makes clear that, at least to the 
latter point, Starr thought state law was controlling. 
167. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
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Indians, sought to enjoin the development of oil and gas leases granted by 
the state of Oklahoma in portions of the river crossing the Osage 
Reservation.168  The state of Oklahoma, intervening on behalf of the lessees, 
argued that the relevant portions of the Arkansas River were navigable under 
state law and thus title to the submerged land rested with the state—not 
the U.S. government.169  The Court did not outright deny the state court 
jurisdiction on the question of what constitutes navigable waters, but 
instead determined that the state court’s opinion over navigable waters 
could not be binding on the federal government, which had not been party 
to the state court adjudication.170  Referring to the Hardin decision, the Court 
accepted that “[i]n government patents containing no words showing 
purpose to define riparian rights, the intention to abide the state law is 
inferred.”171  The Court continued: 
Some states have sought to retain title to the beds of streams by 
recognizing them as navigable when they are not actually so. It 
seems to be a convenient method of preserving their control. No 
one can object to it unless it is sought thereby to conclude one 
whose right to the bed of the river granted and vesting before 
statehood, depends for its validity on nonnavigability of the 
stream in fact.  In such a case, navigability vel non is not a local 
question.172  
In other words, the question of navigable waters for purposes of title is 
generally a local one, but not in cases where the title being asserted was 
granted prior to statehood.  This principle is a little less controversial than 
asserting that the question of navigable waters for purposes of title is always 
a federal question (that comes later).  But looking back at the preceding 
history, it is fairly clear that the status of grants made prior to statehood 
were determined by local law until Brewer-Elliott.  
The Supreme Court in Brewer-Elliott declared that: 
[I]t is not for a state by courts or legislature, in dealing with the
general subject of beds of streams to adopt a retroactive rule for
determining navigability which would destroy a title already
accrued under federal law and grant or would enlarge what
168. Brewer-Elliott, 260 U.S. at 79.
169. Id. at 87.
170. Id. at 86.
171. Id. at 89.
172. Id.
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actually passed to the state, at the time of her admission, under 
the constitutional rule of equality here invoked.173  
Taken literally, each state should have succeeded only to the navigable 
waters defined by the English rule—as was the case in Martin.  That holding, 
however, would have radically upset the established law in many states. 
Instead, the Supreme Court decided to use the navigable-in-fact rule, which 
it had previously applied only in cases regarding the admiralty jurisdiction 
of the federal courts.174
Considering the clear articulation in favor of state sovereignty by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Lamprey, it may not be surprising that the 
monumental turning point, Holt State Bank,
  Declaring navigable-in-fact as the proper rule for all 
states would have upset the state court decisions that had rejected the 
American rule in favor of the English rule such as New Jersey, Illinois and 
Connecticut.  How far-reaching the consequences of the Brewer-Elliott 
decision might have been is not particularly clear.  But the confusion would 
not matter because four years later, the Supreme Court expanded the 
applicability of the federal definition of navigable waters to all questions of 
title.  
175 involved a dispute over title to 
the bed and banks of a Minnesota lake.  In 1926, the United States brought 
suit to quiet title to the formerly submerged land of a lake, which the United 
States claimed had not been navigable and therefore was part of an earlier 
secession of land by the Chippewa tribe to the federal government.176  In 
deciding Holt State Bank, the Court affirmed two lower court opinions that 
found the lake to be navigable.177  He rejected, however, the lower courts 
application of state law as opposed to federal law to reach that 
conclusion.178  In the case below, the Eighth Circuit had stated that “[i]t is 
determined by the law of the state where . . . the waters are navigable, 
subject only to the paramount right of the United States to regulated and 
improve the navigation of those waters for commercial and public 
purposes.”179
173. Brewer-Elliott, 260 U.S. at 88.
  The Circuit Court acknowledged Brewer-Elliott as an exception 
to the long established law but dismissed it as “not material in the 
174. Id. at 85–86.
175. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
176. Frank W. DiCastri, Are All States Really Equal? The ‘Equal Footing’ Doctrine and
Indian Claims to Submerged Lands, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 179, 188–89 (1997). 
177. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 51.
178. Id. at 55.
179. United States v. Holt State Bank, 294 F. 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1923), aff’d, 270
U.S. 49 (1926). 
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consideration of this case.”180  Then, quoting Lamprey at length, the Circuit 
Court dismissed the United States’ claim to title.181  The Supreme Court held 
that this particular aspect of the lower courts’ decisions was in error.  In 
support of the proposition that the question of navigability “is necessarily a 
question of federal law to be determined according to the general rule 
recognized and applied in the federal courts,” the Court cited Brewer-Elliott.182 
“Navigability,” the Court directed, “when asserted as the basis of a right 
arising under the Constitution of the United States, is necessarily a question 
of federal law to be determined according to the general rule recognized and 
applied in the federal courts.”183  Although not calling too much attention to 
the sweeping change this decision made on the settled legal landscape, 
Justice Van Devanter offered some justification for the rule: “To treat the 
question as turning on the varying local rules would give the Constitution a 
diversified operation where uniformity was intended.”184  In United States v. 
Utah, which followed Holt by only five years, the United States successfully 
quieted title in itself “to the beds of the portion of the Colorado river and 
the San Juan river”185 by arguing that the portions of the rivers in question 
were not navigable under the now recognized federal definition.186  The title 
belonged to the riparian landowners along their banks—which happened to 
be the United States government.187  Thus, the “Brewer-Holt-Utah trilogy . . . 
established that navigability for the purpose of determining title was a 
federal law question to be decided by federal courts.”188
B. Considerations of the Equal Footing Doctrine as Applied
to Navigable Waters
  This is the origin of 
the “equal footing doctrine” as applied today. 
In a unanimous 2012 decision, the Court in PPL Montana asserted that 
“any ensuing questions of navigability for determining state riverbed title are 
governed by federal law” since title to these lands “was ‘conferred not by 
Congress but by the Constitution itself’” under the equal-footing doctrine.189
180. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 165–66.
 
181. Id. at 165 (quoting Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn.1893)).
182. Id. at 55–56.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 56.
185. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 90 (1931).
186. Id. at 71–72.
187. Id.
188. Rick Best, The Determination of Title to Submerged Lands on Indian Reservations,
61 WASH. L. REV. 1185, 1191 (1986). 
189. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1227.
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The opinion summarized the preceding history, noting that “[s]ome state 
courts came early to the conclusion that a State holds presumptive title to 
navigable waters whether or not the waters are subject to the ebb and flow 
of the tide.”190  Although implicitly recognizing that states treated the 
question as a matter of state law, the Court claimed that “[t]he rule for state 
riverbed title assumed federal constitutional significance under the equal 
footing doctrine,”191 and cites a string of 19th century cases, such as Martin 
and Pollard, for support.192
One might wonder whether it is sound policy or somehow better to 
have questions of riverbed title decided by federal as opposed to state law. 
The Court in PPL Montana selected its view of the best policy for property 
laws and rejected the equally sound policy arguments of twenty-six states.
  A close examination of the cases cited by the 
Court affirms that Brewer-Elliott and Holt were the first cases to affirmatively 
assert federal law as the exclusive determination of title to submerged 
lands. 
193
The Court expressed some sympathy for the states’ view, but relied on its 
own conclusion that the size of the portions in question was large enough to 
be administrable by different sovereigns.194
190. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1227.
  Furthermore, the Court in PPL 
Montana adopted a different test for title than what has been established by 
the federal courts for federal regulatory jurisdiction.  While the “navigable in 
fact” test applied for purposes of federal regulatory jurisdiction generously 
191. Id.
192. Id. (“In 1842, the Court declared that . . . the people of each
State . . . ‘hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under 
them,’ subject only to rights surrendered and powers granted by the Constitution to 
the Federal Government.  In a series of 19th-century cases, the Court determined that 
the same principle applied to States later admitted to the Union, because the States 
in the Union are coequal sovereigns under the Constitution.”) (quoting Martin v. 
Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (citing Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 228–
29 (1845); Knight v. U.S. Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 
U.S. 1, 26–31 (1894)). 
193. Amicus Brief in Support of Respondent by Oregon et al., PPL Mont., 132
S.Ct. 1215 (2012) (No. 10-218) (arguing that “[a] test for navigability that excludes
segments of navigable rivers from a state’s title would severely hamper public use of
the river by creating segments under private control that could exclude the public”).
194. PPL Mont., 132 S.Ct. at 1231 (citing Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the
Anticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 682–84 (1998)).  Note that the Supreme Court, in 
making this point, cites a Harvard Law Review article regarding the consequences of 
“overdivision.”  This is a purely subjective analysis of policy concerns related to 
property law—what has always been a traditional domain of the state. 
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disregards portability,195
If Holt was the point at which the equal footing doctrine required a 
federal definition of navigable waters, it is proper to inquire what the 
doctrine meant for navigable waters prior to Holt.  From the federal cases 
that reference the doctrine prior to Holt, there appears to be two ways to 
answer this question: Either the equal-footing doctrine assures that each 
state succeeded to nothing less than English common law formulation or it 
guaranteed to the states the power as sovereign to define navigable waters. 
One of the only cases in which the Supreme Court invoked the equal-footing 
doctrine outside of submerged lands provides a useful analog to 
understanding this latter theory.  
 the now separate “navigable-in-fact” test applied for 
purpose of title looks closely at the length of any given portage—effectively 
reducing the public domain in many states. 
In Coyle v. Smith, the Supreme Court rejected a bill that conditioned 
Oklahoma’s admittance to the union on where the State placed its capitol.196 
The Court considered the right of the state to make this decision an inherent 
aspect of its sovereignty, protected by the equal-footing doctrine.197 
Invoking the equal footing doctrine to hold that every state must abide by 
the same common law definition of navigable waters for purposes of title 
would be like holding that since most states placed capitols along a well-
travelled highway in the center of the state, all new states would have to do 
the same to be on an equal footing.  The difference between equal footing as 
applied in Coyle and equal footing as applied to determine title of 
submerged lands is the difference between an equal right to self-
determination and an equal outcome to an already decided question.  Of 
course, one of the problems with concluding that the outcome had to be 
equal is that the states, prior to this reading of the equal footing doctrine, 
had not, as PPL Montana suggests, developed a consistent rule for what were 
to be considered navigable waters.  Understanding that the legal definition 
of “navigability” for purposes of title had been a state law question puts the 
“equal footing doctrine” on its head.  Unlike their forbearers, new states were 
deprived of the right as sovereign to determine the most appropriate rule 
regarding public ownership of submerged lands for their own geography and 
culture.  In this sense, new states were treated rather unequally under the 
equal-footing doctrine and all states found themselves constrained. 
195. PPL Mont., 132 S.Ct. at 1231 (citing The Montello, 87 U.S. 430 (1874)).
196. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579–80 (1911).
197. Id. at 563–66.
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VI. The Persistence of Public Use Rights in Private Waters
The transformation of navigable waters for purposes of title from a
state to federal question had two effects.  The first, as noted, was that states 
suddenly found themselves losing disputes over ownership of submerged 
lands (as was the case in Brewer-Elliot, Holt Bank, and Utah).  The second effect 
was that states began to protect public use of water through other legal 
doctrines that do not depend on the status of title to the underlying 
streambed.  In 1961, the Wyoming State Supreme Court for example, 
decided that title to submerged land was irrelevant to the public’s right to 
use public waters.198
While many state courts have invoked the public trust doctrine as a 
basis for recognizing public use rights in otherwise private waters, it is not 
the exclusive or oldest legal basis for doing so: “public use of navigable 
surface waters may be protected under variations of the public easement 
theory or the public trust doctrine even though the state has relinquished 
bed ownership, or perhaps without regard of subaqueous title.”
  The recognition of public rights and interests based on 
state law in waters and submerged land that, under federal law, are privately 
owned leads to the federal/state law conflict identified but not resolved in 
PPL Montana. 
199  Joseph 
Kinnicut Angell, a prominent author on American law in the early 19th 
century, identified three different types of waters: “First, where it is 
altogether private, as in the case of shallow streams; secondly, where it is 
private property but subject to public use; and, thirdly, where the use and 
property are both public.”200  The following section of this article reviews the 
middle category of mixed public use and private ownership.  First, the 
section analyzes state court decisions that find a traditional “public use 
servitude”201 in private waters; second, the section discusses the more recent 
decisions that have invoked the evolving “public trust doctrine.”202  Both sets 
of cases show courts willing to adapt the law to changing public needs—
such as finding a “public highway” as necessary for the timber industry to 
float logs203 to market or finding a “public trust right” to recreational use.204
198. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 151 (Wyo. 1961).
 
199. Leighton L. Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in
Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 391, 421 (1970); see R. Timothy Weston, Public 
Rights in Pennsylvania Waters, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 515, 516-39 (1976) (discussing the legal 
origins of public rights in surface waters). 
200. JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES 204 (3rd. ed.
1840). 
201. See infra Part IV.A.
202. See infra Part IV.B.
203. E.g. Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9 (1849); Shaw v. Oswego, 10 Or. 371
(1882). 
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A. The Public Use Servitude
Angell noted in his earlier 1824 treatise that some rivers (such as the 
Thames) were “considered as public highways by water,” and as such, private 
riparian owners—even in portions above the high-tide—would be liable for 
impediments to public use.205  These rivers, Angell proclaimed, “are called 
public rivers not in reference to the property of the river, for that is in the 
individuals who own the land, but in reference only to the public use.”206 
Several states that had adopted the limited English rule—that only waters 
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide were public—subsequently found a 
separate “public use servitude” over private streams that otherwise belonged 
to a riparian landowner.207
For example, in Brown v. Chadbourne, the Supreme Court of Maine 
sidestepped its previously held view that the riparian owns the property 
underlying a river not influenced by the tide by adopting a separate test to 
establish where a privately owned river is open to public use.
  
208  The Maine 
court distinguished its rule for title from that of Pennsylvania, where “the 
large fresh water rivers, in that State, are altogether public; not only their 
waters, but their beds,”209 and found that the public had a right to use 
streams capable of being used “for the floating of vessels, boats, rafts, or 
logs.”210  Importantly, the court further found that this use right was not 
established as a prescriptive easement, dependent on showing public use 
for some period of time.211
204. E.g. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984);
Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior 
Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719.  See Brian A. King, The Public Trust Doctrine and Mixed-Use 
Development: The Proposed Golden State Warriors Arena and the Implications for Future 
Development on the San Francisco Bay, 20 Hastings W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 461 (2014) 
(discussing the public trust as related to development of San Francisco’s waterfront 
in the context of the formerly proposed arena for the NBA’s Golden State Warriors). 
  The court reasoned that “[i[f a stream could be 
subject to public servitude, by long use only, many large rivers in newly 
settled States, and some in the interior of this State, would be altogether 
under the control and dominion of the owners of their beds, and the 
205. JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW IN RELATION TO WATER-
COURSES 15 (1824). 
206. Id.
207. E.g., Brown v. Chardbourne, 31 Me. 9 (1849); Shaw v. Oswego, 10 Or. 371
(1882). 
208. Brown, 31 Me. at 19.
209. Id. at 21.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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community would be deprived of the use of those rivers, which nature has 
plainly declared to be public highways.”212  The test to establish a public 
servitude was then simply “whether a stream is inherently and in its nature 
capable of being used for the purposes of commerce” including log 
floating.213
Oregon adopted the same separate test to determine whether the 
public had use rights in private rivers in Shaw v. Oswego, a dispute in the late 
1800’s between a riparian who wanted to build a sawmill by diverting water 
from the Tualatin river and a riparian downstream.
 
214  The downstream 
plaintiff alleged that the permanent diversion of water caused him injury 
since he owned the bed and banks of the Tualatin River.215  The mill-\owner 
argued, in his defense, that the river was a “public navigable stream” and, 
since the state legislature had authorized his diversion, the downstream 
riparian could not claim injury.216  Having previously recognized that a river 
capable of being used to float logs could be used for that purpose, the court 
turned to consideration of the riparian’s interest in a nonnavigable river 
capable of floating logs.217  The Oregon court took a balanced approach.  It 
quoted Lord Hale for the English rule, but recognized that some state 
“courts have held that upon the large fresh water rivers which are navigable 
in fact, the riparian owners do not take to the middle of the river, but that 
the state is the owner of the subjacent soil, and the public have an 
easement in the river.”218  Having surveyed both the English rule and 
American rule, the court decided that the Tualatin river was ill-suited to 
either conclusion.219  Instead, the Oregon court looked favorably at the 
Maine holding in Brown and similar outcomes in Michigan and Wisconsin, 
finding that “where a stream is naturally and of sufficient size to float boats 
or mill logs, the public have a right to its free use for that purpose.”220  Since 
the downstream riparian was in fact the owner of the submerged land, the 
court granted an injunction on the diversion.221
212. Brown, 31 Me. at 21.
  Interestingly, the Oregon 
court suggested that its opinion should not be read as the final say on 
whether Oregon recognized an exception to the English rule regarding title 
to submerged lands: “It is, perhaps,” the court noted, “proper to remark that 
213. Id.
214. Shaw v. Oswego, 10 Or. 371 (1882).
215. Id. at 372.
216. Id. at 373.
217. Id. at 375.
218. Id. at 376–77.
219. Shaw, 10 Or. at 382.
220. Id. at 382.
221. Id. at 383.
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the facts of this case, not coming within the exception to the common law 
principle adopted by some of the courts of the Union, no opinion is 
intended to be expressed on that point.”222
Just as Oregon and Maine adopted “log floating” tests when the timber 
industry was an important part of their local economies, courts in the mid- 
to late-20th century adopted “recreational use” tests when public 
recreational use was increasingly valued.  Two cases in this line also reveal 
that at least some state courts had not necessarily ceded the argument over 
whether federal or state law determined title to the submerged land.  Both 
the Missouri court in Elder v. Delcour
 
223 and the Wyoming court in Day v. 
Armstrong224 asserted that title to submerged lands was still a question of 
state law, but established public use rights regardless of the title to 
submerged lands.  The Missouri Supreme Court noted that it previously 
“held to the more rigid [English] rule, and with some aggressiveness,” and 
therefore could not conclude anything other than the river at issue was 
privately owned.225  On the other hand, the Wyoming Supreme Court refused 
to decide on a rule for title to submerged lands because it found the 
question irrelevant to determine the extent of public rights in waters.226
The Missouri court reached its conclusion in Delcour by noting that 
ownership of submerged lands did not give a riparian absolute “title and 
ownership.”
  
Both courts concluded that the public could make use of the rivers in 
question despite the fact that the riparian owner did have or might have title 
to the submerged land.  
227  Instead, ownership “was subject to the burdens imposed by 
the river,” which included the fact that “he could not divert or obstruct the 
flow of the water without civil and criminal liability.”228  In other words, the 
court found that since the waters were public, then, under the appropriate 
inquiry, the title to the submerged land was “subject to an easement for 
public travel by boat and wading.”229
While asserting the right of the state to set the rule for ownership, the 
Wyoming State Supreme Court in Day also determined that ownership was 
  
222. Shaw, 10 Or. at 383 (“It is . . . perhaps proper to remark that the facts of
this case, not coming within the exception to the common law principle adopted by 
some of the courts of the Union, no opinion is intended to be expressed on that 
point.”). 
223. Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835 (1954).
224. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
225. Delcour, 364 Mo. at 842–43.
226. Day, 362 P.2d at 143.
227. Delcour, 364 Mo. at 844.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 843.
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irrelevant to the public’s right to use public waters.230  In rejecting the 
assertion that the federal test of navigability demarcated the extent of public 
rights in waters, the court noted that although: 
There is an element of paramount control by the Federal 
government with respect to navigable waters . . . that superior 
right exists only where navigable waters may be used in either 
interstate or international commerce. . . .  [T]he state may lay 
down and follow such criteria for cataloging waters as navigable 
or nonnavigable, as it sees fit, and the state may also decide the 
ownership of the submerged lands, irrespective of the navigable 
or nonnavigable character of waters above them.231  
Although firmly establishing that “the right of every person over or 
through whose lands the waters belonging to the State are found or flow . . . 
is subject to the State’s right to use and control its waters,”232 the court 
notably provided an exception where “the title of the Federal government . . . 
was incumbered when that title passed from the Federal government to the 
State upon its admission to the Union.”233  Then, perhaps knowing that the 
right of the state to define navigable waters for purposes of title was in 
doubt, the Wyoming court declined to pass judgment on the “criteria used 
by courts of different states and of the United States to determine 
navigability of waters and ownership of land beneath them.”234  Instead, the 
court decided that ownership of the bed was irrelevant since the state 
owned the water overflowing it,235 and announced that waters capable of 
floating were available to the public for such use.236  Further, the court held 
that the public could scrape or touch the bottom of the river, as well as 
“disembark and pull, push or carry over shoals, riffles and rapids” as 
necessary to realize “the full enjoyment of the public’s easement.”237
230. Day, 362 P.2d at 151.
  Unlike 
231. Id. at 143 (citing Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913)).
232. Id. at 144
233. Id.
234. Id. at 143.
235. Id. at 144–45.
236. Day, 362 P.2d at 147 (“Irrespective of the ownership of the bed or channel
of waters, and irrespective of their navigability, the public has the right to use public 
waters of the State for floating usable craft and that use may not be curtailed by any 
landowner.  It is also the right of the public while so lawfully floating in the State’s 
waters to lawfully hunt or fish or do any and all things which are not otherwise made 
unlawful.”). 
237. Id. at 145–46.
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some other states on this point, however, the court explicitly stated that “to 
wade or walk the stream remains un unlawful trespass.”238
The right of states to define navigability for purposes of title—as noted 
so clearly in the Day opinion—has not been relinquished without defiance. 
In Arkansas v. McIlroy,
 
239 the Arkansas Supreme Court revisited its definition 
of “navigable waters” to ensure that the “finest white water float stream” in 
the state could be used by the public for recreation.240  The State Supreme 
Court of Arkansas first recognized that according to its precedent, the “river 
is legally navigable if actually navigable and actually navigable if 
commercially valuable.”241  Conceding that the Mulberry River failed to meet 
this standard, the court applauded the language of its precedent 
anticipating that this definition was subject to change with the changing 
culture and needs of the state,242 and adopted the view that if a river could 
“be used for a substantial portion of the year for recreational purposes,” it 
was navigable and open to the public.243  The court’s opinion is somewhat 
opaque in terms of what effect the new definition had on title to the 
submerged land.  The majority mentions “title” only in noting that 
navigability is a federal question in “title disputes between the state and 
federal governments” but “[o]therwise, the state may adopt their own 
definitions.”244  Reading the opinion closely, it appears that Arkansas’ new 
rule was meant to affect title—not just use.  For one, the court cited Donnelly 
to support its right to define navigable waters.245  The question at issue in 
Donnelly, as previously discussed, was whether Mr. Donnelly, upon the water 
of the Klamath River, was on land belonging to the state or the tribe.246
238. Day, 362 P.2d at 146.
 
239. Arkansas v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d. 659 (Ark. 1980).
240. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d.at 662.
241. Id. at 663.
242. Id. at 663–64 (quoting Barboro v. Boyle, 178 S.W. 378, 380 (Ark. 1915)) (“’It
is the policy of this state to encourage the use of its water courses for any useful or 
beneficial purpose.  There may be other public uses than the carrying on of 
commerce . . . .  [T]he waters of the lake could be used for the purpose of flooding 
the rice fields and for other agricultural purposes . . . .  [T]he banks of the lake may 
become more thickly populated, and the water could be used for domestic purposes. 
Pleasure resorts might even be built . . . .  [T]he water might be needed for municipal 
purposes.  Moreover, the waters of the lake might be used to a much greater extent 
for boating, for pleasure, for bathing, fishing and hunting than they are now used.’”). 
243. Id. at 665.
244. Id. at 663 (citations omitted) (citing Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S.
243 (1913)). 
245. Id.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 154–61.
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Second, the Arkansas court cited from its own precedent Lutesville Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. McLaughlin—a case which could not be more directly fought over 
ownership of the submerged land because it was a dispute over sand and 
gravel dredged from the bottom of the Spring River.247  Finally, Chief Justice 
Fogelman recognized in his dissent that the adoption of the recreational use 
test would affect the title of submerged land.  His dissent deserves to be 
quoted if only for the tenor of his disapproval: “The adoption of a so-called 
modern test changes a rule of property and apparently divests titles that 
have been vested under the prior test.  In Arkansas, unlike communist 
states, it is the right of private property, not the rights of the public, that 
rises above constitutional sanction.”248
B. The Public Trust Doctrine
 
Given the ubiquitous application of the public use servitude to protect 
and provide public use rights in otherwise privately owned streams, one 
might wonder what the “public trust” has to do with public use rights in 
waterways at all.  Why do courts turn to this doctrine to find public use 
rights in public waters?  The Wyoming Supreme Court in Day, for example, 
noted that the “waters themselves belong to the State and are held in trust 
by it for the benefit of the public.”249  Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court, 
in Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, determined that the private 
owner of a streambed could not prohibit the public from recreating in the 
water since “[t]he . . . public trust doctrine do[es] not permit a private party 
to interfere with the public’s right to recreational use of the surface of the 
State’s waters.”250  On the other hand, the Arkansas Supreme Court in McIlroy 
only mentioned the public trust in reference to an Ohio opinion, placing the 
phrase in quotation marks that suggest a degree of skepticism: “Applying a 
‘public trust’ to the Little Miami River, the Ohio court found that the State of 
Ohio holds these waters in trust for those Ohioans who wish to use the 
stream for all legitimate uses, be they commercial, transformational, or 
recreational.”251
It might be helpful to start out by declaring what the public trust 
doctrine is exactly, but since the public trust doctrine is applied differently 
  In declaring its new rule for rivers with public use rights, the 
Arkansas court did not seem to think the public trust doctrine was a 
necessary element. 
247. Lutesville Sand & Gravel Co. v. McLaughlin, 26 S.W.2d 892, 892–93 (Ark.
1930). 
248. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d. at 667–69 (Fogleman, C.J., dissenting).
249. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961).
250. Mont. Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont.
1984). 
251. McIlroy, 595 S.W. 2d. at 664.
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by each state where it is recognized, finding one consistent definition is 
impossible.252  Blumm generalized the trust doctrine into four 
applications:253  First, the doctrine can be seen as a public easement, “a 
property right entitling the public to maintain access to water recourses.”254 
Second, the doctrine is invoked as a defense to takings claims, wherein “the 
state need not compensate for limiting or restricting private development of 
trust resources because . . . there are no vested rights in trust property.”255 
The third application is as a rule of statutory construction that directs courts 
to construe “statutes terminating public trust restrictions . . . narrowly.”256 
Finally, the public trust doctrine also can provide a sort of “hard look” 
obligation, wherein the courts impose “procedural requirements in the name 
of the public trust.”257
In three relatively recent cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court—where 
the public trust doctrine arguably originated some 150 years prior—
expanded the uses protected by the public trust to include recreation, 
extended the reach of burdened property to include dry sand beaches, and 
found public rights protected by the public trust doctrine even in private 
property.  The first case, Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The Sea, 
was instigated by an oceanfront municipality’s decision to “charge non-
residents higher fees than residents for the use of its beach area.”
  To see how the doctrine is invoked to provide for 
public use rights in water and submerged land, it is helpful to look at a 
series of cases related to beaches and then review the 1984 Montana 
decision in Curran. 
258  The 
court concluded that the “common law right of access to the ocean in all 
citizens of the state” was safeguarded by the public trust doctrine.259
252. There is a public trust doctrine in federal common law relevant to
determining the status of trust lands granted by the federal government to private 
owners prior to statehood.  See, e.g., United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court recognized “recreation,” in addition to 
253. Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water
Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 578 (1989). 
254. Id. at 580.
255. Id. at 577.
256. Id. at 587.
257. Id. at 592.  The more expansive public trust doctrine can be traced to
Joseph Sax and his 1971 book “Defending the Environment.”  See JOSEPH L. SAX,
DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971).  For examples of courts applying this version of 
the public trust doctrine see, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 
(Cal. 1983) and Robinson Twp. v. Pa., 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013). 
258. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 48–
49 (N.J. 1972). 
259. Id. at 51.
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traditional trust concerns such as fishing, navigation and commerce.260  In 
the second case, Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court found that the public “may have a right to cross privately 
owned dry sand beaches in order to gain access to the foreshore” in order to 
realize the benefit of trust resources.261  Finally, in Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. 
Atlantis Beach Club, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the public 
trust doctrine required that a private club allow public access to an upland 
sand beach for a reasonable fee.262
Once the Montana court in Curran established that the state owned all 
of the surface water in the state,
 
263 it employed an analysis similar to the 
New Jersey beach cases: that the state’s ownership is burdened by a public 
trust and that the state must ensure the public use of the waters, including 
recreation.  “In sum,” the court concluded, “we hold that, under the public 
trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that 
are capable of recreational use may be so used by the public without regard 
to streambed ownership or navigability for non-recreational purposes.”264 
One could read the Montana approach as unique to western states that 
assert ownership of all surface waters, since the Montana court emphasized 
that “the waters [are] owned by the State under the Constitution.”265 
Western states, which use a prior appropriation system to allocate water 
rights, claim sovereign ownership of the waters in their state constitutions 
and have defended that ownership as being recognized by the Desert Lands 
Act.266
260. Borough of Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 53.
  But the states that have the common law riparian regime for 
determining water rights have also found public use rights in surface waters 
261. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363–64 (N.J.
1984). 
262. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112, 113 (N.J.
2005). 
263. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont. 1984).
264. Id. at 171 (“[A]ny surface waters that are capable of recreational use may
be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for 
nonrecreational purposes.”) 
265. Id. at 170.
266. See, e.g., Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
161–62 (1935) (“Congress must have known that innumerable instances would arise 
where lands thereafter patented under the Desert Land Act and other lands patented 
under the pre-emption and homestead laws, would be in the same locality and 
would require water from the same natural sources of supply. In that view, it is 
inconceivable that Congress intended to abrogate the common-law right of the 
riparian patentee for the benefit of the desert landowner and keep it alive against the 
homestead or pre-emption claimant.”). 
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via the public trust doctrine,267
Unlike the Wyoming Day decision, the Montana court did not assert a 
state right to define navigability for title.  The court stated that 
“[n]avigability for use is a matter governed by state law.  It is a separate 
concept from the federal question of determining navigability for title 
purposes.”
 so this aspect of the Montana opinion should 
not be overemphasized when discussing the issue more broadly. 
268 Like the Wyoming court, however, the outcome of the 
Montana opinion is that title to the submerged lands is irrelevant for 
establishing public use.  Nevertheless, the Montana court must have been 
aware that navigability for title was, at least for some time, a state law 
question.  Not only did the Curran decision cite Day, wherein the Wyoming 
court articulated its right to define navigable waters for purpose of title, the 
Curran decision cited Lamprey at length.269  The Lamprey opinion cannot be 
understood as anything but a case related to title of the submerged land 
since the fight was over the dry land the receding lake left behind.270  The 
court’s reliance on Lamprey and Day, in fact, provides a nice narrative of case 
law from 1893, where the issue of ownership was purely a matter of state 
law, to 1961, when the Wyoming court still thought title might be an issue of 
state law, but found the question irrelevant to determining public use 
rights.271  The narrative concludes with Curran’s holding that title is a matter 
of federal law, but title is irrelevant to the question of public use rights.272  In 
an opinion issued by the Montana court the same year as Curran, the court 
rejected an argument that permitting public use was a deprivation of a 
property right, stating simply that “ownership of the streambed is irrelevant 
to determination of public use of the waters for recreational purposes. 
Navigability for recreational use is limited, under the Montana Constitution, 
only by the capabilities of the waters themselves for such use.”273  The only 
dissenting justice of the seven involved in the Curran decision lamented that 
“[b]y adopting the recreational use test . . . this Court . . . may be creating a 
procedure whereby valuable property rights are condemned and taken 
without payment of compensation.”274
267. See, e.g., State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 336 N.E.2d 453, 457
(Ohio Ct. App. 1975). 
 
268. Curran, 682 P.2d at 170.
269. Id. at 169 (discussing Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143
(Minn.1893)). 
270. See Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1139–40.
271. Curran, 682 P.2d at 48–52.
272. Id. at 56.
273. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1093 (Mont.
1984). 
274. Curran, 682 P.2d at 173.
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VII. Conclusion
Whatever “equal footing” meant when Thomas Jefferson and his
colleagues put those words to an early draft of the Northwest Ordinance, 275 
it was not a rule that new states were bound by a federal definition of public 
waters.  Nevertheless, that is undoubtedly what the phrase has come to 
mean in the modern judicial lexicon.  At the same time that federal law has 
become the authority for title to submerged lands, state law has expanded 
public use rights in the waters above these submerged lands both by use of 
the traditional “public servitude” doctrine and by invoking the public trust 
doctrine.  As was evident from the reaction to the PPL Montana decision, how 
these two bodies of law overlap create uncertainty for both private 
landowners and the public.  Mr. Kennedy argued that Curran was a judicial 
taking because title to submerged land is a matter of federal law and the 
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that a “landowner’s right to exclude [is] 
‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.’”276  Further, Mr. Kennedy cited U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent to suggest that any incidental contact with the submerged 
land authorized by the state is a taking.277  On the other hand, some 
commentators believe that the public trust doctrine, as a “background 
principle” of state property law, may be an effective defense to a taking 
challenge.278
There are really two different uncertainties.  First, there is uncertainty 
as to the actual nature of property interests in waters that are not navigable-
in-fact using the segment-by-segment approach.  In Tennessee, state 
judicial opinions predating the Brewer-Holt-Utah trilogy clearly hold that 
temporary disruptions in an otherwise navigable body of water or any 
segment thereof do not result in private ownership.
  
279
275. See Barrett, supra note 
  The equal footing 
doctrine applied by the Supreme Court in PPL Montana put that century-old 
principle of state property law in jeopardy.  In Montana, a now-settled 
principle of state law—that the public may access any water susceptible to 
recreational use—has also been thrown into jeopardy.  A second, more 
profound uncertainty is that property owners and members of the public do 
79, at 765 n.26. 
276. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
277. Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant James C. Kennedy, supra note 17, at
40 (noting that “where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical 
invasion of her property - however minor - it must provide just compensation” (citing 
Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005)). 
278. See John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles
Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931 (2012). 
279. State v. W. Tenn. Land Co., 158 S.W. 746, 751–52 (Tenn. 1913).
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not know whether they should refer to federal or state law to resolve these 
disputes.  Imposing federal law into these title disputes unsettles a long-
established separation of powers principle that property law is reserved for 
the states.  Of these two uncertainties, the second seems the most 
problematic.  Many state courts wisely withheld from pronouncing rigid, 
inflexible rules about private ownership in water and submerged land.280 
These courts recognized that water will always be of some interest to the 
public and that to give away that public interest without reserving the right 
to change the rule in the future could lead to dramatic consequences.  As 
Singer notes, “we care about getting things right and that often requires us 
to reformulate rules when they lead to untoward results.”281
In criticizing the decision of the Montana Supreme Courts, the Court in 
PPL Montana quoted Brewer-Elliott: “It is not for a State by courts or 
legislature, in dealing with the general subject of beds or streams, to adopt 
a retroactive rule for determining navigability which . . . would enlarge what 
actually passed to the State, at the time of her admission under” the equal-
footing doctrine.
 
282  At the time most states entered the union, there was not 
a rigid rule for what constituted public waters—there were many different 
rules applied individually be each of the states.  The only thing that was 
clear at the time was that state law—not federal law—determined what was 
or wasn’t part of the public domain.  Thanks to the “equal footing” doctrine, 
the future of public rights in water hinges on reference to something that 
never was. 
280. See Joseph Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369, 1374 (2013) (noting that “standards allow property rights to be adjusted when 
they conflict with the property rights of others or when the exercise of property rights 
cause externalities or systemic disturbances that undermine the infrastructure of the 
property system”).  
281. Id.
282. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1235.
